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AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH PRIORITIES AND PROBLEMS: 
Reflections from the World Bank’s "Sector Policy Paper"
By Reginald Herbold Green
Why Research? Why the Bank?
Carefully implemented agricultural research can be an efficient 
source of economic growth and is an important contributor to the 
achievement of key development objectives ... (especially)
Adequate food ... for much of the developing world ... investment 
must be significantly expanded to improve the capacity to conduct 
agricultural research ....
Agricultural Research’s raison d ’etre is thus squarely laid out on page 5 
opening its "Summary and Recommendations". The reason for World Bank 
concern (related on page 11 to CGIAR and the ICRIS but elsewhere to 
agricultural research/extension at national level) flows from what it 
sees as:
the Bank's dominant position as the supplier of external resources 
for agriculture and rural development.
In short research is critical to enhanced production (and to how it is 
distributed) and the Bank is heavily involved in furthering agricultural 
production. Therefore, it should both help finance research and form 
a view on how much and what type of research to finance and encourage.
Six Main Themes
The Report revolves around six main themes - or perhaps more accurately 
hypotheses supported (in most cases) by fairly convincing evidence 
and argument.
First, because land availability is increasingly limited^production per 
hectare increases of 2% a year will become increasingly important in
most Third World countries. Achieving this will require research.
(A caveat might be entered that improving extension/use of what is already 
known and identifying/extending best known peasant techniques are critical 
complements, but they are not substitutes especially in the longer term.)
Second, Third World agricultural research is inadequate in quantity (using 
a 2% of agricultural GDP target which, while rough and ready, seems a 
reasonable rule of thumb) and especially so for food crops relevant to 
very poor farmers and consumers.
Third, national research often lacks overall design, specified objectives, 
field testing, links to extension and knowledge of actual farm conditions 
so that even the resources spend are not producing the results they might. 
(This might give pause - in the countries to which it applies most 
forcibly - before embarking on a 10% a year real research growth programme 
as recommended. Perhaps the base needs to be redesigned and reconstructed 
first?).
Fourth, the ICP.IS/CGIAR network are 12^% of all TW agricultural research 
at 3% of all world agricultural research. They need selective expansion 
but also better links with national systems. (Amen seems the only answer 
to that but the implication that the gaps are all the result of the 
national systems^with none relating to "the big fat cigar" as a bitter 
national research official called it^seems much too sweeping.)
Fifth, the income distribution effects of agricultural research are not 
well understood. Absolute (and perhaps relative) inequalities among 
peasants is increased, tenant farmers often lose their land, low income 
consumers benefit, isolated and resource-poor geographic areas are 
further immiserized/marginalised. Part of this results from failure to 
specify income distribution goals and relate research to finding results 
serviceable in meeting them. (The starkness of the results seems 
understated while the commitment to research oriented to helping the 
poor peasant produce more is episodic rather than integral in the main 
text - and still more so in the Bank's actural rural production 
programme support.)
Sixth, research will not/cannot be adopted if the economic environment 
confronting farmers is unfavourable, eg. if prices are too low. 
(Concentrating on prices without equal emphasis on extension, land tenure, 
input availability, the relative cost shifts against mechanisation/ 
fertilisation resulting from the hydrocax’bon price increases, the impact 
of lack of health - education - pure water on time use as well as ability 
to work and willingness to stay in farming seems somewhat surrealistic. 
Prices are important, like research, but also like research they are not 
everything.)
The Bank and Agricultural Research - Lessons of Experience
Agricultural Research reviews the Bank's long and not insignificant 
experience in the field with considerable incisiveness. This is notably 
not a Bank publication in which "The Bank can do no wrong", even if the 
reader may quibble at the degree of certainty implied for some of the 
new departures proposed.
Some of the "lessons of experience" are:
a. project research often is too small, too little related to overall 
national (or even crop) research and over too short a time frame 
to pay off;
b. support for research must involve concern with the sector's design
and philosophy as well as bits and pieces within it if it is to pay off
c. effective support for institutional and programme development requires 
a 10-15 year time frame in many cases (ie. "repeater" projects);
d. too many expatriates create too much discontinuity (and too much of 
a gap frcm actual farmers?);
e. too little interdisciplinary work (eg. re income distribution before 
the event), too little field testing in general and especially under 
conditions pertaining to actual peasant farmers has been included;
f. the value of ICRIS' work has been below potential because links with 
them have not been built into national programmes.
This is a commendable exercise in self-criticism even if the authors - 
perhaps understandably - do not put the record quite as pungently as
4this. (However, all these points are made in the text - especially 
on pages 7-8.) In all candour, the Bank's record is no worse than 
average and other institutions are often les3 willing to face up to the 
fact of failures.
Toward a National Paradigm
From its review of the present situation, the Bank's experience and what 
needs to be done, the authors draw up six basic criteria/guidelines for 
national research programmes. These are related to (and modified by) the 
diversity of existing situations (regionally and nationally) which are 
summarised rather lucidly, if perhaps too succinctly.
First, agricultural research should receive resources equal to about 2% 
of GDP (in many cases requiring sustained medium-term 10% annual increases) 
backed by more professional and more technical staff.
Second, greater emphasis should be placed on nutrition, food crops 
directly relevant to poor consumers and to poor peasant growers, and on 
relating proposed improvements to what actual small peasants can understand/ 
do/afford. (In this context risk reduction is mentioned but probably not 
stressed enough as inability to weather - often literally - setbacks is 
perhaps the most critical single factor holding back and/or immiserizing 
poor peasants in Africa and Latin America as well as Asia.)
Third, national research needs coherent sets of goals, programmes 
articulated toward (and plausibly adequate for) meeting them and a clear, 
two way interaction with extension.
Fourth, links to ICRIS to gain information and to do field testing and 
adaptation should be a central component in most national programmes. 
(Advocating ICRIS' setting up of sub-centres in the main sub-regions to 
which their work should bo relevant might be a useful complement to this.)
Fifth, research philosophy should be multidisciplinary, based on field 
studies, related to use "circumstances" (unfortunately not described as 
including peasant perceptions, need3, targets and knowledge.').
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staff and to encouraging them to be productive. (Unfortunately as with
the 10% growth and the emphasis on prices as ’’the" evironmental factor
this seems largely to mean "higher salaries" which has the demerits of
trying to overcome complex problems with the simple brute force of
money and that finance is in very scarce supply in most Third World countries).
Commendations, Caveats and Queries
Few studies cn agriculatural research set out the situation, the weaknesses, 
the requirements and guidelines for development so succinctly, lucidly 
and accessibly to the non-specialist reader. Few in-house institutional 
studies demons trate an equal rigour in looking at their own record and 
learning from it.
However, the Eank is not a homogenous - let alone a monolithic - body.
Its research and consultancy reports (even when approved at Board level 
as this one has been) and its operational programmes often seem to have 
rather separate lines. How much Agricultural Research - especially its 
calls for research on income distribution and using income distribution 
goals in selecting areas of technical research as well as of relating to 
the conditions under which poor peasants actually live and cultivate - 
will become an integral part of Bank programmes and projects remains to 
be seen.
The Report raises a number of issues which seem to require further 
exploration (and to be more complex) than it provides. Given its broad 
scope and brevity this is as much a commendation of power to provide a 
stimulus to further thought as a criticism for simplification. Several 
of these topics are sketched in the balance of this review.
What Do We Know?
The data base on Third World agriculture is almost unbelievally weak. 
This is as true for research as for other topics. The Report uses 
tne best (least bad) data available but some questions arise.
First, are research expenditures and research personnel really accurately 
known? For the countries the author knows best some of the expenditure 
and personnel data seem surprising (both high and low) compared with other 
sources.
Second, if expenditure in some cases is much above what is estimated (eg. 
near the 2% target) and results are still meagre, what does this imply 
about immediate expansion?
Third, if the FAO production per hectare data are even approximately 
correct, the cross country variations within regions are quite startling 
eg. -1% a year in 1970s for Nigeria and +2% a year for Tanzania in 
cereals; +2% a year for China and -§% a year for Thailand in legumes;
+3% a year for Colombia and a year for Jamaica in sugar cane.
Static? Random fluctuations? Differences in research? Or what?
The point is not that action should be held up until the numbers are 
perfect. But they are so bad both a certain reserve about what they 
mean and a research priority to improving and interpreting them seem 
warranted.
Research Base and Project Content
How serious the lack of an adequate, field tested production oriented 
research base can be is well illustrated by the World Bank’s Lake 
Nyanza area rural development project in Tanzania. The whole production 
improvement package consisted of three varieties of millet seed (not field 
tested), five cultivars of cassava (limited field testing) and seed 
dusting with insecticides (fully tested). The main three crops - in 
terms of cash income - of the region cotton, maize and paddy had nothing.
The projected gains from utilising the new "knowledge" were necessarily 
pure guesses (except for the seed dusting) as no evidential base existed. 
The acceptance rates and gross output growth (unit gains times numbers 
accepting) had no basis beyond pure guesses (or the rates of acceptance 
"needed" to got a 24% social rate of return?).
7The results are hardly surprising. Output grew very little - except for 
cassava; one cultivator was successful leading to a surplus (leading to 
a loss by the public sector "last resort*1 purchaser) and to shifts out of 
the badly needed cotton and maize. Acceptance rates were lower than 
estimated. This could not be attributed to peasant inertia - acceptance 
of and village input into water supply, health and education facility 
and tree planting aspects of the project (all with more prior research 
and field testing than production) exceeded targets.
What Is A National Strategy?
The absence of coherent national research strategies is plain enough.
So are some elements toward constructing them, eg. selecting production, 
consumption, distribution of gains goals on a crop by crop, region by 
region, target group by target group basis, and feeding these into 
technical research design in a way comprehensible for picking objectives 
such as risk of crop failure reduction, increased yield with low water 
and fertilizer inputs, reducing peak (but not necessarily overall) labour 
input demand (a serious constraint in many peasant systems). Similarly 
an institutional structure furthering both initiatives on new paths
✓
and response to former needs and potentials is critical. To achieve these 
requires closer political-professional, interdisciplinary research, 
professional and research-extension interaction than now exists in more 
than a handful of countries. To accomplish all this requires more 
resources - both personnel and financial - on a sustained basis.
To get that far i_s progress. But the sub-segment articulation in the 
Report seems to loose focus and cohesion. Finance, personnel, institutional 
structures, priority to research, ultimate (or political or real world) 
goals, technical goals (or means) are discussed separately with no clear 
indication of what systematic interactions are needed. One is still 
several steps av/ay from having a set of guidelines for articulating a 
national research programme of the type Agricultural Research posits as 
necessary.
8Extension» Extrusion and Excrescence
Extension services make repeated appearances in Agricultural Research, 
largely in calls for improving them, relating them better to research 
and to getting field testing and feedback from them. They are not examined 
systematically - perhaps because they are not usually considered to be 
research proper (albeit the Bank in projects and programmes tends to treat 
research and extension as a single, integrated component).
A taxonomic analysis would seem to be needed in many countries. In a 
number - notably in Africa - the extension services appear to have the 
poorest demonstrable overall benefit/cost ratios of all major heads of 
government expenditure and to survive - even if starved of funds - more 
because they are one of the things "every government has" than for any 
evident good they do beyond a few specialised crops and a few atypical 
officers.
%
Yfaat are some of the reasons?
a. nothing to extend (research inadequacy, lack of field testing, failure 
to learn best peasant techniques to generalise);
b. inability to comprehend what they are to extend (inadequate education
and inadequate effort by researchers to reach their immediate "audience") ;
c. lack of locally relevant (as opposed to generalised^slightly out of 
focus to wierdly inappropriate) knowledge to extend (lack of articulated 
research and field testing, distrust of local extension workers ability 
to adapt and interpret from general guidelines, too frequent transfers
of officers);
d. procedures for extension which are not time effective - eg. always 
using one on one as opposed to group contact and demonstration - or 
educationally unsound - eg. advising a farmer briefly twice a year 
with no demonstration of most of techniques and no comprehensible 
written or graphic aids to leave as reminders. (Failure to perceive 
that in a bsic sense agricultural extension is a branch of adult 
education and to organise both its substance and training for its 
personnel accordingly.);
9e. recurrent shuffling of system personnel structures (eg. generalist to 
crop specialist and back) and institutional responsibilities (eg. 
ministry to crop authorities to regions to a random clutter of all) 
in a way maximising confusion and minimising stability (mistaking 
institutional reform as a cure for basic content deficiencies and/or 
pulling up the seedling to look at it every few days);
f. deep peasant suspicion and low acceptance (often from a history of 
inappropriate advice and/or advice which ignored the rational risk 
and pre-results cash outlay aversion of peasants);
g. staff who are objectively incompetent (underpaid, undertrained, of 
low status and - in many African field level cadres - probably, as 
a result, a fair sample of below average capability and diligence 
peasant farmers).
If this taxonomy even begins to hit the mark - and IRRI work showing how 
badly its advice was misextended (extended?) to peasants (especially 
small peasants in low income areas) suggests it may be quite general even 
among apparantly above average systems - there is a clear implication. 
Parallel to any national agricultural research development programme must 
go a comparable extension rehabilitation and redesign programme. More 
of the same or marginal adjustments are unlikely to be adequate in more 
than a few countries.
From CIGIAR to the Field
The Report's emphasis on national system linkages with and orientation to 
identifying, field testing, adopting and extending ICRIS work nationally 
is clearly justified. Its apparent view that all is well ón the ICRI 
side vis a vis their openess and outrench to national programmes seems 
rather more controversial.
Especially (but is it uniquely?) in Africa most ICRIS seem to have little 
contact with national agencies and to do little to initiate such contact. 
Y.Tien the nine Southern African states made semi-arid research (most of 
their agriculture is semi-arid) a joint priority and asked ICRISAT to 
establish a regional sub-station as a catalyst for increased and co-V 
ordinated national work, ICRISAT clearly indicated lack of interest on 
its part.
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Surely, inore regional sub-centres and more ICRI initiative in explaining 
what they have to offer and how it can be used to national institutions 
is needed. The ICRIS have more money, more staff, more experience, 
more knowledge of what they have to offer and how it can be (and indeed 
has been) successfully used nationally than do a majority of the national 
research institutions.
Staffing- Issues of Quantity and Composition
Agricultural Research makes a good case that more fully qualified professionals 
are needed in most national research programmes and a plausible one that an 
8% a year increase in their numbers (where technically feasible) would be 
desireable in a majority of countries. But is_ this the greatest personnel 
bottleneck?
The Report's own commont that - especially in Africa - technical,
paraprofessional and other supporting staff ratios .to fully qualified
professionals are as low as under one to one versus four to one in many
developed economy programmes deserves more followup than it is given.
Since professionals are in very short supply and take a long time to train,
the optimal ratio should surely be higher - say five to one - not lower
than in countries with ample supolies of professionals. If that be the thirteen
case, then ten to / times as many additional technical/paraprofessional/ 
supporting staff are needed as fully qualified professionals.
In fact, agricultural research seems to be a fairly extreme example of 
a general problem - middle level personpower is often scarcer and its 
training less well provided for than high level personpower. As a result 
high level personpower are forced to do the work their supporting staff 
should do and/or fail to get much valid work done at all because of lack 
of backup. Middle level personpower requirement estimation and training 
development is often (especially in Africa) the central problem in 
personnel strategy, not a secondary or peripheral one.
"A Man Outstanding In His Field"
A peasant farmer and an agricultural research expert can each be described as 
a an oui.s sanding in his field (more accurately, a person as many peasants
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and some researchers are women but women make no appearance in this Report). 
But often they appear to have little else in common - their fields 
apparently do not adjoin let alone overlap.
The interdisciplinary approach - from setting research objectives and 
collecting baseline data through selecting technical research targets 
and field testing results to extension and evaluation - should at least 
make the fields adjoin. Its aim is to discover peasant crops and 
potentials (to see what crops and techniques deserve research priority), 
how what innovations could or could not actually be employed (ie. what 
typical "farm systems' are and to extend knowledge (and hopefully access 
to inputs, buying points, storage) in such a way as to raise "acceptance 
ratios".
So far so good but the approach remains top down and Platonic guardianship 
oriented (the standard weakness of the World Bank). Two way communication 
is indeed commended - among research and extension professionals of 
various disciplines, not between them and peasants. There is no clue
that asking peasants what they needed or what their priorities were
should or could be a key element in target setting and research design.
(One baseline study for the Kigo-ma Regional project in Tanzania done by 
a local institution for the Bank, did adopt that approach. But its 
very interesting findings as to peasant priorities do not seem to have
influenced project design at all.)
Still less is there any hint that "best known" peasant technology/systems 
is often much better than "average in use" and more easily extendable/ 
adaptable to other peasants (including by demonstrations by the peasants 
who use it). Unprofessional this concept may be and "dangerously" 
participatory, but especially until more field tested modern research 
results are to hand it has substantial potential (at least partly 
realised on the too rare occasions it has been practiced) for raising 
yields. It is also the way to make the peasants and the research
experts fields overlap securing a genuine common understanding and 
effort.
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Who Is To Got V.rhat? Why? How?
Distribution is a central political economic issue and targeting who 
gets what and how a central policy and research problem. That point of 
view is fully accepted by Agricultural Research - unlike some more recent 
Bank reports which seem to view distribution as a dispensable optional 
extra which should be stripped off the production vehicle when hard times 
come.
This approach has several implications for research design, operation, 
extension ar.d review.
First, more knowledge about present income distribution (by area, 
occupational group, size of holding etc.), consumption patterns/sources 
of income in relation to income distribution, impact of post agricultural 
research and extension is needed. Precision (especially neat decile 
scales) is not essential nor for many purposes much to the point - a 
reasonably accurate, even if rough sketch map of reality and the 
directions in which it is changing will serve.
Second, a rough set of goals as to distribution (who to benefit? How 
much? Where? In what ways?) is needed from political decision takers. 
(This is not an area in which technicians can decide and make their 
decisions stick - nor should it be. Nor is an agricultural research 
institute usually a very promising institutional base for overturning an 
oligarchy or junta). These then need to be articulated in a way allowing 
identification of a technical research programme which, if successful, 
would move income distribution in the desired direction - a task for 
inter (multi) disciplinary professional cooperation and dialogue.
Third, identifying research approaches which can benefit poor farmers 
(if they are a priority group as in the Report) . These do exist but
are not likely to be chosen - eg. by seed breeders - unless the technical 
parameter sought - eg. low risk, suitable for poor soil, adapted to low 
and erratic rainfall - is specified because these characteristics do not 
usually go together with maximum output per hectare of good land with 
high, assured water and input availability.
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Fourth, reorienting extension services to save low income peasant 
households (especially those headed by women) who normally receive less 
and less competent attention and creating an institutional structure 
which actually gives such households at least equal access to seeds, 
tools, fertiliser and other necessary inputs and non-exploitative 
buyers (admitedly much easier to specify than to design and to design 
than to achieve!).
Fifth, to design ongoing evaluation of results in terms of distribution 
(of cash income, of household food supply, of rural jobs and wage-rates) 
so .that, negative deviations from planned/desired results can be 
identified in time to take corrective action before they become 
entrenched patterns.
The Invisible Worsen
In one respect Agricultural Research does not break with the main tradition 
of Bank reports and studies. Women are invisible (in this case not 
even being "given" a token page or two under a "women's issues" rubric). 
This is a trifle surprising since many peasant farmers (a majority of 
household heads in some areas and a majority of workers in most) are women 
and since problems of intra-household labour, decision taking, production 
and income division have been repeatedly demonstrated to be critical to 
understanding, working with, introducing changes in peasant agricultural 
systems.
This invisibility of women presumably partly explains lack of attention to 
two key aspects in peasant household "provisioning" and capacity to work - 
water and fuel - since both are predominantly "women's (and girls) work". 
In some areas half women's time goes to collecting wood and fetching water 
with fairly evident implications for peak crop season labour availability 
(and/or availability of water and cooked food to sustain labour in the 
fields during such periods). Further, lack of pure water is a (in some 
cases the) major cause of disease which tends to lower ability to work 
and therefore lower food availability and greater susceptibility to disease 
While by no means attacking only women, such diseases seem to have a 
particularly severe impact on infant, young child and mother mortality.
Thus research on improving access to pure water and to low cost
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(preferably labour cost only fuel) is not a "social" or "amenity" concern - 
it is part and parcel of comprehensive agricultural research oriented to 
raising peasant production potentialities and attainments.
In some cases the same is true of food preparation. For example, in 
much of Africa, millet is a low risk crop compared to maize because it 
is more drought resistant. However, it requires much longer to prepare 
(decorticate and grind) and must be prepared more frequently (because 
the meal spoils quickly). This high preparation time cost is one 
reason improved millet seed, even when available, does not have high 
acceptance ratios - especially when the women who do the preparation 
are also the main household grain growers. In Botswana research on 
improved (time saving) preparation of millet seems to have increased 
acceptance of growing millet. The payoff on selected similar 
agricultural research in associated time cost reduction (and not just 
in millet) would probably be high. The invisibility of women - quite 
apart from its normative implications - is a barrier to professionally 
competent and comprehensive agricultural research designing and to 
raising agricultural production.
